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TAXING CONSUMPTION OR
INCOME: DU PAREIL AU MÊME?
Sijbren Cnossen*
SUMMARY
Income and consumption comprise the two main tax bases in most countries, leaving many
governments with the perennial dilemma of deciding which ought to be the focus of fiscal
policy. However, in Canada the situation is much less ambiguous; the existing Canadian tax
regime disproportionately favours direct, income-based taxation, deriving over two-thirds
[this includes property tax revenue] of tax revenues from this stream. This paper argues that
Canada’s narrow focus on direct taxation leads governments to miss out on the revenue-
stabilizing effects that a greater emphasis on consumption taxes would bring. Tilting the
balance toward indirect consumption taxes like the GST would benefit public revenues
because: i) demand fluctuates less than income; ii) consumption is largely local, reducing tax
avoidance; and iii) the GST is less amenable to being co-opted for market-distorting political
purposes. As income and consumption taxes are broadly similar in their effects, a shift from
the former to the latter would have few consequences for Canadian employment, investment
and saving. The author provides a summary of income and consumption tax structures in
several Western countries with consumption-oriented tax structures to contend that it’s time
Canadian governments embraced meaningful tax reform.  
* The author is an advisor, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis and Professor of
Economics at the University of Pretoria. This paper was prepared for the 2nd Symposium on Tax
and Economic Growth: The GST at 20 — The Future of Consumption Taxes in Canada, The
School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, 2-3 November 2011. The author is most grateful
for the perceptive comments received from Jonathan Kesselman and Jack Mintz on an earlier
version of the paper. Also, the paper has benefited from an earlier article co-authored with Lans
Bovenberg (Cnossen and Bovenberg, 2011).   
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IMPOSER LA CONSOMMATION OU 
LE REVENU: DU PAREIL AU MÊME?
Sijbren Cnossen*
RÉSUMÉ
L’impôt sur le revenu et les taxes à la consommation constituent les deux principales assiettes 
fiscales dans la plupart des pays, si bien que de nombreux gouvernements sont confrontés 
en permanence au dilemme de déterminer sur laquelle de ces deux solutions concentrer leurs 
politiques fiscales. Toutefois, au Canada, la situation est beaucoup moins floue; le régime fiscal 
canadien favorise de façon disproportionnée l’impôt direct sur le revenu et tire de cette source 
plus des deux tiers de ses recettes fiscales (cela comprend les impôts fonciers). On soutient ici 
que le Canada fonde une trop grande part de ces recettes sur l’impôt direct et prive ainsi le 
pays des effets stabilisateurs sur le revenu que pourraient avoir des politiques davantage axées 
sur les taxes à la consommation. En faisant pencher la balance du côté des taxes indirectes à la 
consommation, par exemple la TPS, on produirait un effet bénéfique sur les recettes publiques 
parce que : i) la demande fluctue moins que le revenu; ii) la consommation est locale dans une 
large mesure et permet de réduire l’évitement fiscal; iii) la TPS est moins susceptible d’être 
instrumentalisée à des fins politiques, ce qui fausse le marché. Étant donné que l’impôt sur le 
revenu et les taxes à la consommation ont des effets largement similaires, le choix de cette 
deuxième option aurait peu de conséquences sur l’emploi, l’investissement et l’épargne au 
Canada. L’auteur propose une synthèse des deux structures d’imposition dans plusieurs pays 
occidentaux qui privilégient les taxes à la consommation, et soutient qu’il est temps pour les 
gouvernements canadiens d’opter pour une réforme fiscale substantielle.
* L’auteur est conseiller au CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, et professeur à l’Université de Pretoria. Ce 
rapport a été préparé pour le 2e colloque sur la fiscalité et la croissance économique. Tax and Economic Growth – The GST at 
20 — The Future of Consumption Taxes in Canada (la TPS a vingt ans – L’avenir des taxes à la consommation au Canada) à l’École 
de politiques publiques, Université de Calgary, 2 et 3 novembre 2011. L’auteur remercie chaleureusement Jonathan Kesselman et 
Jack Mintz pour leurs commentaires pertinents sur une version antérieure de ce rapport. De plus, l’auteur a puisé dans un article 
antérieur cosigné avec Lans Bovenberg (Cnossen et Bovenberg, 2011).
1. INTRODUCTION
Income and consumption are the two main tax bases in most countries. Generally, income is
comprehensively taxed at graduated rates that increase as income increases, although corporate
profits are usually taxed at proportional rates. By contrast, consumption is taxed at flat rates on a
transaction-by-transaction basis, although a lower or zero rate is sometimes applied to basic
necessities. The choice between taxing income or consumption, or rather of effecting changes in
the tax mix is often thought to have profound economic implications. Would a tax mix change
from income to consumption promote labour market participation, because prima facie paid
work would become cheaper relative to unpaid work and leisure? Would it stimulate saving
since consumption would become relatively more expensive? Would it promote investment
because the after-tax return on new capital outlays would increase? 
This paper explores the implications of a change in the tax mix. It argues that, in practice, the
income tax (IT), defined to include social security contributions and the corporate income tax,
and the general consumption tax, called the Goods and Services Tax (GST),1 are more alike than
is often thought. Accordingly, the effects of a shift in the tax base from income to consumption
on employment, saving and investment should be smaller than perhaps expected, although it
would enhance revenue stability, because the GST is a more robust tax than the IT. In analyzing
the tax mix change, the paper assumes that (i) total tax revenue should not be affected (revenue
neutrality), and that (ii) the distribution of the tax burden over various income groups should
remain the same (distributional neutrality).  
The analysis is carried out in an international context. The second section broadly compares the
Canadian tax system to the tax systems in other countries with similar socioeconomic settings.
Next, the third section focuses in particular on the taxation of consumption, labour and capital,
again on a comparative basis. Against this background, the fourth section dwells on the
similarities and differences between consumption and income taxes in a closed and an open
economy setting, respectively. It attempts to highlight the main considerations that enter into the
analysis of a tax mix change.2 A concluding section sums up the paper’s main arguments and
conclusions. 
1 The GST in Canada (as well as the Québec Sales Tax (QST) and the Harmonized Sales Tax (HST)) and some other
countries is, in principle, identical to the Value-Added Tax (VAT) in the European Union (EU) and many other
countries. Also, in theory, the GST and the VAT are identical to the Retail Sales Tax (RST), even regarding the timing
of tax collections. For a thorough analysis of similarities and practical differences, see Cnossen (1987). Under the
RST’s suspension method, in particular, it is difficult to relieve businesses from the tax on purchases without
significant tax avoidance with goods and services sold to consumers. For the equivalence of various consumption
taxes, including the Flat Tax and a Personal Expenditure Tax, see Cnossen (2011).  
2 According to the conference’s program, the author was asked to provide “a review of the economic analysis of
consumption taxation in general and value added sales taxation in particular — including the role of the GST/HST in
the overall tax mix, optimal mix and comparison to income taxes.” For an analysis of the tax mix change in the
Canadian policy context, see Dahlby (2003) and for a more comprehensive discussion of tax-mix issues, see
Kesselman (1998). 
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2. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
This section compares the Canadian tax system to the systems in the United States (US), other
countries with Anglo-Saxon taxing traditions (United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand,
Ireland), and the largest continental European Union (EU) member states (Germany, France,
Italy) that have a preference for a relatively large public sector.3
a. Total tax level
The latest revenue statistics published by the OECD (2011) show that Canada’s total tax ratio,
i.e., tax revenues collected by the federal, provincial and local governments expressed as a
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), was approximately 32 percent in 2009.4 This
was much higher than the tax burden in the US (24 percent), roughly similar to the tax ratio in
three out of four other Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia being the exception), but much lower
than the burden in three major continental EU member states. Canada’s tax ratio was almost
two percentage points lower than the unweighted OECD average of nearly 34 percent.
Diagram 1 compares the various countries.
DIAGRAM 1. TOTAL TAX BURDEN IN CANADA AND SOME OTHER COUNTRIES IN 2009
Source: Appendix A. 
3 Mexico (a member of NAFTA, like Canada) and Japan have not been included in the analysis, because their tax
systems are difficult to compare with Canada’s system.
4 The tax ratio broadly connotes a country’s preference for doing things through the public rather than the private
sector. Tax shares, i.e., revenues from individual taxes expressed as a percentage of total tax revenues, denote a
country’s preference for one tax over another tax.
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3The diagram makes a distinction between direct taxes and indirect taxes. As shown in
Appendix A, direct taxes comprise taxes on labour (personal income taxes on wages and
salaries, including the labour income component of the profits arising in proprietorships and
partnerships; social security contributions; and payroll taxes) and on capital (personal income
taxes on dividends, interest, rents, capital gains, and the return on the equity invested in
proprietorships and partnerships; corporate income taxes; and taxes on property). Indirect taxes
consist of taxes on general consumption, specific goods and services, and on the use of goods
and services. 
As shown in Diagram 1, Canada appears to have a preference for direct taxes (76 percent of
total tax revenue) over indirect taxes (24 percent). This preference is even stronger in the U.S.
(81 percent vs. 19 percent, respectively), but all other countries rely relatively more heavily on
indirect taxes than Canada does. If property tax revenue is left out, Canada derives over two-
thirds of its total tax revenue from income-based taxes.
Economically, the distinction between direct and indirect taxes is not very meaningful;
certainly, it says nothing about the incidence of the various taxes. Perhaps the significance of
the direct-indirect tax distinction is mainly political. Countries with a large share of direct taxes
in total tax revenue seem to prefer the tax system for redressing differences in the income
distribution as determined by the market, whereas countries with a lower share (and a higher
tax ratio) tend to favour the expenditure system.5 In this respect, Canada, along with other
Anglo-Saxon countries, appears to occupy the middle ground between the US and most EU
countries.  
b. Composition of tax revenues
Diagram 2 shows the composition of the tax burden in Canada and some other countries. As
regards direct taxes, Canada appears to have a relatively high preference for taxes on personal
income and property over social security contributions. Admittedly, this picture is somewhat
skewed, because some countries, e.g., New Zealand and Australia, pay social security benefits
out of general revenue, and because some other countries do not levy income tax on social
benefits, permitting them to levy lower contribution rates to finance the same level of net
benefits.6 But, generally, labour is taxed higher when compared with other Anglo-Saxon
countries, although EU countries tax labour higher still.7
5 For a highly interesting, still relevant, account of the political economy of taxation, see Wildavsky and Webber
(1986).
6 For an analysis, see Adama and Ladaique (2009), who show that accounting for the effect of the tax system (and
private social expenditure) on public social expenditure leads to a greater similarity in overall social expenditure-to-
GDP ratios across countries and to a reassessment of the magnitude of welfare states.
7 In Appendix A, Personal income under the heading Labour includes the capital income of sole proprietorships and
partnerships, as well as rental, interest and dividend income. EU statistics split personal income into a labour income
component and a capital income component (see the PM figures in the Appendix). However, data for Canada, the
US, Australia, and New Zealand are not available. In most countries, more than 90 percent of personal income
consists of labour income, including the labour income of sole proprietors and partners.
As regards indirect taxes, general consumption appears to be taxed much lower in Canada than
in most other countries. While Canada collects 13 percent of total tax revenue from its general
consumption taxes (GST, QST, HST, RST), the share in other Anglo-Saxon countries is on
average 20 percent. Germany’s reliance on the VAT is around 20 percent, too. The share of
Canada’s general consumption taxes in total tax revenue is merely two-thirds of the OECD’s
average. On the other hand, the share of taxes on specific goods and services (among others,
excise duties) and taxes on the use of goods (e.g., motor vehicle license taxes) are broadly in
line with those of most other countries.
DIAGRAM 2. COMPOSITION OF THE TAX BURDEN IN CANADA AND SOME OTHER COUNTRIES IN 2009
Source: Appendix A. 
Generally, the comparison indicates that Canada would not be out of step with other countries
if it lowered taxes on labour and made up for the revenue shortfall by increasing consumption
taxes.
3. TAXATION OF CONSUMPTION, LABOUR, AND CAPITAL
In analyzing the shift in taxation from labour to consumption, it is necessary to take a closer
look at the GST, and the taxation of employment income and capital.
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a. A closer look at the GST
Canada’s GST is better designed than the EU’s VAT, but not as well as the GSTs of New
Zealand and Australia. As shown in Table 1, the differences centre mainly on exemptions and
rate differentiations. Under a best-practice GST there is no place for exemptions, except for
purely administrative reasons, e.g., to exempt small businesses from the obligation to register
and pay tax. Exemptions (i.e., no GST on output and no credit for GST on inputs) violate the
logic and functionality of the GST because they imply that the GST on exempt goods and
services depends on the share of taxable inputs in output, a nonsensical and highly inefficient
basis for taxation.8 Moreover, as shown in several studies, the dollar savings of lower-than-
standard rates on food, including domestic zero rates, accrues mainly to the well-to-do.9 More
generally, differentiated rates are difficult to justify in countries with sophisticated income tax
and targeted social benefit systems. 
TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF GST/VAT/RST SYSTEMS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES
8 For a concise discussion of the pernicious economic and administrative effects of exemptions, see chapter 8 in Ebrill,
et al (2001). For more on the Canadian situation, see Smart (2012).
9 Three examples to support this finding are the following. A New Zealand study (Australian Society of CPAs, 1998)
indicates that 85 percent of the dollar savings of a hypothetical zero rate on food would go to households with the
highest 80 percent of income. In the same vein, calculations by the US Congressional Budget Office (1992) show
that a zero rate on food would reduce the regressivity of a hypothetical VAT by only 18 percent. Perhaps more
telling, a study in Sweden (Skall Matmomsen Slopas? 1983) finds that a zero rate on groceries would mainly benefit
cohabiting yuppies — single people with high incomes. Of course, this ignores the perceptual and political
arguments for exempting some necessities, such as basic groceries.
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NAFTA
Canada
FEDERAL
PROVINCIAL
Quebec
NF & L
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
British Columbia
United States
FEDERAL
STATES (45+DC)
GST
QST
HST
HST
HST
HST
RST
RST
RST
None
RST
5 (13)
8.5
8
8
8
8
7
5
7
6-8
New low-cost housing
Same as federal GST
None
Not applicable
0.50 Basic groceries, selected
agricultural and fishing
products, medicines and
medical devices
Same as federal GST
None
None
Standard exemptions (except
lotteries and gambling, commercial
land and buildings, postal services);
legal aid; ferry, road and bridge tolls
Same as federal GST
Food, most services
Food, agricultural machinery,
services
Exemptions (major items)*
Domestic zero rate
(major items)
Lower rates
(major items)
Main
rate
Country Name
Rate coverage
Co
lle
ct
io
n-
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
Sources: OECD (2011a) and IMF (2010).
Note
* Standard exemptions include postal services; transport of sick/injured persons; hospital and medical care; human blood,
tissues and organs; dental care; charitable work; education; non-commercial activities of non-profit organizations; sporting
services; cultural services (except radio and television broadcasting); insurance and reinsurance; letting of immovable
property; financial services; betting, lotteries and gambling; supply of land and buildings; certain fund-raising events.
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Anglo-Saxon 
countries
UK
New Zealand
Ireland
Australia
European
Union
Italy
France
Germany
VAT
GST
VAT
GST
VAT
VAT
VAT
17.5
12.5
21
10
20
19.6
19
5: Certain pharmaceutical
products, fuel and power,
energy saving materials,
children’s car seats
None
4.8; 13.5: Newspapers,
electricity, gas, fuel for
certain purposes, holiday
accommodation, building
services, immovable
property, concrete, repair
services, culture, sports,
short-term car and boat
hire, agricultural services
None
4, 10: Food, medicines,
housing, books
newspapers, gas,
transport, urban waste,
shows
2.1, 5.5: Food and
beverages (on and off
premise), pharmaceutical
products, medicines, gas,
electricity, newspapers,
books, hotels,
entertainment, passenger
transport, sewage, refuse
collection, work on
dwellings
7: Food, books,
newspapers, transport,
plants, flowers, devices for
the disabled, museums,
zoos, circuses, cultural
events
0.44
0.93
0.61
0.57
0.40
0.48
0.42
Food, prescribed drugs,
medicines, new housing,
passenger transport,
books, newspapers,
water, sewage
None
Food, oral medicine,
books, children’s
clothing and footwear,
medical equipment,
seeds, fertilizer
Food and beverages
(except prepared),
health and medical care,
water sewage, farm land,
cars for disabled,
religious services, health
insurance
None
None
None
Standard exemptions, sports
competition, burials and cremations,
works of art
Financial services, residential rents
and premises
Standard exemptions (except supply
of land and buildings, recreational
and sporting services), passenger
transport, broadcasting, water,
sports admissions, funeral
undertakings, travel agents
Financial services, residential rents
and premises, school canteens
operated by non-profit bodies
Standard exemptions (except
medical care if not earmarked for
elderly or poor, commercial land
and buildings), taxis, burials
Standard exemptions (except letting
of immovable property, sports,
theatres, concerts, cinemas), work
on monuments, graves and
cemeteries
Standard exemptions
Exemptions (major items)*
Domestic zero rate
(major items)
Lower rates
(major items)
Main
rate
Country Name
Rate coverage
Co
lle
ct
io
n-
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF GST/VAT/RST SYSTEMS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES (cont’d)
Unfortunately, the EU’s exemptions of health care, education, cultural and sporting services,
financial services and insurance, immovable property, lotteries and gambling have entered the
GST/VAT jargon as “standard exemptions” (OECD, 2011a). This is an utter misnomer, since
‘standard’ connotes “something established by authority, custom, or general consent as a model or
example”.10 Surely, this connotation does not apply to the GST/VAT exemptions in the EU, which
are anything but a model or example to emulate, although many countries have done so. Even if
nearly everyone has a cold in winter, it should still not be considered normal to be sneezing all
over.
Although full taxation of the exempt services should be the aim, Canada has chosen a second-
best option for most of them (financial services and insurance being an important exception). It
largely neutralizes the anomalous treatment by nearly fully refunding the GST on purchases by
entities represented by the MASH (municipal-academic-schools-hospitals) sector (Gendron,
2012). New Zealand does better still, however, by taxing these activities in full, eliminating
any possibility that the services might compete unfairly with similar fully taxed services
provided by the private sector.11 New Zealand also does not have a misguided zero rate on
basic groceries (a double dip in combination with a GST rebate scheme for lower-income
groups). The zero rate distorts consumption patterns, harms competition, and reduces welfare.
As shown in Table 1, the domestic zero rate for so-called necessities is also found in other
Anglo-Saxon countries (but rarely elsewhere). It is another example of trying to redress
market-determined incomes through the tax system, rather than the better-targeted expenditure
system.
The effects of the exemptions and zero rates are reflected in lower collection efficiency ratios,
defined as the actual GST/VAT base (generally ascertained by dividing tax collections by the
standard rate) as a percentage of consumption expenditures found in national accounts.12 As the
last column of Table 1 indicates, Canada’s GST taxes half of all consumption expenditure
compared with 93 percent in New Zealand. (Admittedly, Canada’s ratio should be corrected for
the sizable rebates of the MASH sector (Bird, 2009 and Smart, 2012) which artificially lower
collection efficiency.)13
10 Dictionary and Thesaurus − Merriam-Webster Online.
11 The worst option, found in the EU and many other countries with VAT, is to leave the exemptions dangling.
Admittedly, some EU countries have refund schemes for provinces and municipalities, but their selective nature
brings its own problems in train. See Wassenaar and Gradus (2004). For an excellent, general review of the legal
complexities of the exemptions under the EU VAT, see De la Feria (2007). Of course, taxing the public sector and
public-sector-related activities (and then increasing budgetary allocations to ensure the same net level of public
expenditures) implies an artificial increase in the total tax ratio, which might not find grace in the eyes of some
politicians.
12 This assumes that administrative efficacy is the same across the countries under review — plausible, except perhaps
with respect to Italy.
13 The collection-efficiency ratios in this paper are from IMF (2010). Smart (2012) cites a much higher ratio of 0.66 for
Canada computed by the OECD (2011a). He rightly points out that the OECD’s figure is too high, because all
revenues from the GST, QST and the HSTs are divided by the standard GST rate without taking account of
provincial tax rates. After correcting for this mistake, Smart calculates Canada’s VAT collection-efficiency ratio at
0.48, approximately the same as the IMF figure shown in Table 1 of this paper.
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To conclude this very brief and possibly inadequate analysis of the shortcomings of the GST on
a positive note: Canada offers a useful example of how other federations and common markets
should coordinate federal and provincial claims on the shared consumption tax base through a
federal GST, an independently administered QST (Québec), piggybacked HSTs (three Atlantic
provinces and Ontario), non-coordinated RSTs (three provinces), or no consumption tax at all
(Alberta). The lesson, which should not be lost on the EU, is that GST or VAT coordination
should not be effected through complicated design changes, but through overarching audit
controls (Bird and Gendron, 2010; and Cnossen, 2010).   
b. Taxation of labour income
In view of this paper’s topic, it is also necessary to examine the taxation of labour income.
Here, this is done on the basis of the average and marginal tax burden (personal income tax
plus employee and employer contributions) of individual households, for example, a married,
two-earner family with two children in which the primary earner earns the wage of an average
production worker (APW), as defined by the OECD (2011b), and the spouse two-thirds of the
APW’s wage.14 As Table 2 indicates, a Canadian household of this type pays more income tax
and social security contributions than similar households in most other Anglo-Saxon countries,
including the US. On the other hand, the marginal effective income tax rate differs less
compared with other Anglo-Saxon countries. Both the average and the marginal tax rates are
much higher in the EU member states, where everyone and everything is taxed higher than
elsewhere.15
14 Accordingly, the calculations are not necessarily informative about the overall progressivity of the respective
countries’ tax systems. For a review of the methodology and the limitations of ‘taxing wages,’ see Heady (2003).
15 But see above at footnote 6 for the caveat.
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TABEL 2. EFFECTIVE AVERAGE AND MARGINAL TAX RATES ON WAGE INCOME (AS % OF LABOUR COSTS) IN 2009
Source: OECD (2011b), tables 1.12 and 1.17, column 7. The income tax plus employee and employer contributions less
cash benefits have been calculated for a married, two-earner family with two children in which the primary earner earns
the wage of an average production worker (APW) and the spouse two-thirds of the APW’s wage. The effective
GST/VAT/RST plus excise/use tax rates were calculated by Leon Bettendorf of CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic
Policy Analysis as the ratio of total revenues from these taxes as a percentage of household consumption expenditures
shown in national accounts. The total effective average tax rates have been calculated on the basis of the formula
(a+b)/(1+b) in which a is the average effective income tax and b the average effective GST/VAT/RST + excise/use tax
rate. The total effective marginal tax rates have been similarly calculated. The progressivity parameter has been
calculated on the basis of the formula (1-c)/(1-d) in which c is the total effective marginal tax rate and d the total
effective average tax rates.
This picture changes, however, when taxes on goods and services are pencilled in.16 These
taxes tend to be distributed proportionally over a significant part of the income range; hence,
the marginal tax rate is assumed to be the same as the average rate.17 Generally, the effective
tax rates on consumption tend to reduce the differences between the various total effective tax
rates. Since these tax rates are comparatively much lower in Canada than in most other
countries, the effect is that the total average and marginal effective tax rates do not rise as
much as in other countries.  
16 It should be emphasized that the tax rates for goods and services shown in the table are total average effective tax
rates unrelated to the type of household for which the effective income tax rates have been calculated. For an attempt
to compute average consumption tax wedges by type of household on the basis of household budget surveys, see
Picos-Sánchez (2009). Unfortunately, the countries covered in this author’s paper differ from the countries dealt with
in this study.
17 Based on a review of distributional impact studies, Warren (2008) argues that consumption taxes have a regressive
impact on the distribution of household disposable income, particularly at the lower (and higher) end of the income
distribution.
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NAFTA
Canada
United States
Anglo-Saxon
Countries
United Kingdom
Australia
New Zealand
Ireland
European Union
Germany
France
Italy
OECD (unweighted
average)
26.7
24.7
28.3
19.9
14.0
20.0
43.1
43.9
42.0
29.7
44.4
34.4
44.7
63.8
41.0
35.9
60.4
52.0
54.1
44.7
15.5
6.8
18.9
15.5
24.5
25.6
23.7
22.5
21.6
24.9
0.76
0.87
0.77
0.45
0.69
0.80
0.70
0.86
0.79
0.79
36.5
29.5
39.7
30.6
30.9
36.3
54.0
54.2
52.3
43.7
51.9
38.6
53.5
68.7
52.6
49.0
68.0
60.8
62.3
55.7
Total effective tax rates
Progressivity
Average Marginal Average =
Marginal
Average Marginal
Countries
Effective income tax rates
Effective tax
rates on goods
and services
The average tax rates are an indication of the income and revenue effects of taxation (including
social security contributions), while the allocative effects are influenced by the marginal tax
rates. Also, to some extent, the average tax rate should affect the place of residence of
employees.18 That the marginal rates in Canada are relatively low is also evident from the
progressivity parameters in the last column of Table 2, which shows the elasticities of
disposable incomes with respect to gross incomes. The figure of 0.76 for Canada means that
the disposable income (after tax and social security contributions) of an average production
worker increases by 0.76 percent for every increase of the gross wage with one percent. A
lower value of the parameter therefore implies a higher degree of progressivity. Most tax
systems in the sample are less progressive than Canada’s system, with the exception of the
systems in Australia, Germany and New Zealand.
c. How is capital income taxed?
As elsewhere, the nominal taxation of capital income in Canada is easy to grasp, but it is
difficult to get a grip on the actual or effective taxation. Table 3 indicates that the nominal tax
rates on corporate income and on capital income subject to the personal income tax compare
favourably with those of other countries. The federal government taxes corporate income at
16.5 percent19 and the provinces at rates ranging from 5 percent in Newfoundland to 16 percent
in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. The most common rate is 10 percent, so that the
combined rate is 26.5 percent. Double taxation of distributed profits is mitigated at the federal
level through an imputation system under which dividends are grossed-up by 41 percent
corporate tax and a tax credit of 16.44 percent of the grossed-up dividend is subsequently
provided against the federal income tax liability. Similar arrangements exist at the provincial
level. Further, the double tax on retained profits is mitigated by exempting half of the capital
gain realized at the time corporate shares are disposed off. Apart from the deferral benefit, this
means that capital gains are taxed at half of the marginal tax rates applicable to other income.
18 While the IT, including the corporation tax, is a major determinant of the place at which business is carried on.
19 The federal corporate income tax rate began decreasing in 2008 and will continue to decrease until it reaches a target
rate of 15 percent as of January 1, 2012. Mintz (2007) recommends a combined federal/provincial rate of 20 percent,
uniformly applied to large and small businesses, to minimize distortions.
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TABLE 3. TAXES ON CAPITAL INCOME IN 2011 
Source: Various sources on the internet, accessed 19 December 2011, and Cnossen (2010).
Elsewhere, the UK, Australia and New Zealand have an imputation system, too. The US,
Germany and Italy, on the other hand, tax dividend income at a flat rate lower than the highest
income tax rate, while France subjects 60 percent of dividend income to tax.20 Ireland fully
taxes dividends twice, at the corporate level and again at the individual level. Similar to
Canada, Australia exempts half of realized capital gains, but most other countries apply lower
flat rates. Germany and Italy distinguish between gains on ordinary shares and on shares in
closely held corporations (which are taxed higher because the gains often represent labour
income sheltered in corporate form). Most other capital income, such as interest, is nominally
taxed at ordinary income tax rates (if at all).
20 For a full review of the corporate income tax systems in the European Union, see Cnossen (2010a).
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NAFTA
Canada
United States
Anglo-Saxon
Countries
United Kingdom
Australia
New Zealand
Ireland
European Union
Germany
France
Italy
Federal: 16.5%;
Provincial: 5% to
16% (additive;
most common
10%)
Federal: 35%
States: 0% to 10%
(deductible from
federal)
28%
30%
30%
12.5%
Federal: 15.825%;
Local: 14.35% to
17.5% 
34.43%
31.4%
Federal: tax
credit of 16.44%
of gross-up;
Provincial: 6.4%
to 15.08%
Taxed at 5% or
15%
Tax credit of 1/9th
of grossed-up
dividend
Tax credit of 30%
of grossed-up
dividend
Tax credit of 30%
of grossed-up
dividend
Taxed at marginal
rates
Flat PT of 26.83%
2/5 of net
dividend exempt
Flat PT of 12.5%
Federal and
Provincial: 
50% of gain
exempt
Long-term: 15%
Short-term: 35%
18%
50% of gain
exempt
Taxed to some
extent
25%
26.375%
19%
12.5
Federal: 29%
($128,800+);
Provincial:
11.16% to 21%
Federal: 35%
($379,151+)
States: varying but
maximum 11%
50%
(₤150,000+)
45%
($180,000+)
35,05%
($70,000+)
41%
(balance)
45%
(€250,731+)
41%
(€70,830+)
47.3%
(€69,721+)
Federal and
Provincial: 
50% of gain
exempt
Long-term: 15%
Short-term: 35%
18%
50% of gain
exempt
Taxed to some
extent
25%
14.77%-47.47%
19%
49.72 % of gain
Federal: 15%
($41,544);
Provincial:
4% to 11%
Federal: 10% 
(up to $8,500)
States: varying
20% 
(up to ₤35,000)
15%
($6001-$37,000)
12,54%
(up to $14,000)
20% 
(€65,600; two-
earner couple)
14%
(€8005-€52,881)
5.5%
(€5,964-€11,896)
20,3%
(up to €10,329)
Personal income taxes (PT)
Substantial
holdings
Lowest bracket Highest bracket
Ordinary shares
PT-rate on capital gainsPT treatment of
dividends
CT-rateCountries
Corporate taxes (CT)
Of course, the question for this paper is how much capital income is effectively taxed, and,
more pertinently, to what extent the normal return to capital is taxed. After all, the taxation of
the normal return distinguishes the income tax from a broad-based consumption tax. The
answer is difficult to give without further empirical research. What is known, however, is that
corporations employ a variety of methods to shift their taxable profits into non-taxed or lower
taxed entities or countries, such as transfer pricing (charging lower/higher prices for products
sold to/bought from related lower-taxed entities), thin capitalization (substituting equity by
debt, the interest on which is deductible and possibly not taxable in the hands of the recipient),
or royalty payments (payments on patents and know-how located in low-tax countries). While
Canada and other countries have adopted aggressive policies and practices to counter these
forms of tax evasion and avoidance, their persistent occurrence provides prima facie evidence
that full success is not being achieved. 
In the field of personal income tax, much capital income escapes taxation through the use of
deferred savings accounts, or by converting the income into capital gains that are either exempt
or whose taxation is deferred until realization. The existence of positive capital income figures
in the statistics (at most some 10 percent of total income assessed) published by Canada
Revenue Agency does not necessarily indicate that capital income is (adequately) taxed,
because the combination of tax-preferred savings accounts (and/or accelerated deprecation) and
interest deductibility may even imply that capital is subsidized through the tax system. In an
early article, Poddar and English (1999) estimate that only some 25 percent of investment
income is subject to the personal income tax in Canada.21 The incomplete taxation of capital
income suggests that the normal return on capital (at most one to two percent anyway), and
perhaps part of the above-normal return, may not be taxed under the income tax.
4. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN GST AND IT 
The previous section showed that Canada appears to impose broad-based taxes on
consumption, labour and capital without significant excise tax-type features. Accordingly, a
shift from income to consumption taxation seems an appropriate topic for discussion. In
comparing the GST with the IT, this section dwells first on various conceptual characteristics
of both taxes in a closed and an open economy setting, respectively. The discussion indicates
that the two taxes differ little. Subsequently, various differential effects are noted, which
suggests a preference of the GST over the IT.
21 In a more recent study for the US, Slemrod (2007) estimates that “the amount of revenue collected [from taxes on
capital income] is fairly small and that the tax rate at the margin on new saving and investment [which he estimates
at 14 percent] is well below the corporate statutory rate or the top personal income tax rate.”
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a. Closed economy
In a closed economy, the IT is a tax on labour and capital income. Labour income consists of
wages and salaries (including the value of labour services performed by the owner in his or her
business), fringe benefits, pension income and social benefits. Also, the managerial risk
premium is included in labour income. Capital income consists of business profits
(representing the return on equity, corrected for the labour income of proprietors and partners),
dividends, capital gains, interest, rental income and rental values. Capital income can also be
said to comprise the normal return (equal to, say, the interest on medium-term government
bonds in Canada) on equity and debt, and ‘rents,’ also called above-normal returns, which
cannot be attributed to the use of a specific type of labour or capital.
The GST is a tax on consumer expenditure. The size of the consumption base equals the
algebraic sum of all values added in the production-distribution process. In each production
and distribution stage, value added is determined as the difference between sales (output) and
purchases (inputs), including investment goods. This difference is equal to the sum of wages
and rents (also called business cash flow), calculated on a cash-flow basis. The GST can be
characterized, therefore, as a cash flow tax on labour income and rents.22
As discussed in Box 1, the most important difference between the IT and the GST concerns the
treatment of the normal return on capital, which is taxable under the IT but not under the GST.
This difference is largely eliminated if contributions to old-age pensions and annuities (future
consumption) are deductible under the IT (or, equivalently, not included in taxable income) and
if investments are written off immediately.23 As a result, the IT, too, becomes a tax on labour
income and rents. The effect of immediate expensing of investment goods can also be achieved
by permitting a deduction for the normal return on capital, debt and equity at the business
level, while exempting the return at the level of the recipient.24 Obviously, some combination
of accelerated depreciation and exemption of the normal return would have the same effect. In
practice, of course, the IT would be more progressive than the GST, because it is better able to
take ability-to-pay factors into account. The condition of income neutrality, a prerequisite for
the analysis in this paper, nullifies this difference, however, so that there is substantial overlap
between the IT and the GST.25
22 Taxation on a cash-flow basis means that receipts and expenditures are attributed to the year in which they occur, in
contrast to taxation on the basis of the matching principle under which gains and costs are attributed to the year to
which they relate. Both cash-flow accounting and accounting on the basis of the matching principle are forms of
accrual accounting, that is, receivables and payables are accounted for in the period in which the claim or liability
arises, not in the period in which they are settled, which would be called cash basis accounting.
23 For a useful discussion, see Bradford (1996).
24 A deduction for the normal return on equity (interest is already deductible) is known as the Allowance for Corporate
Equity (ACE), pioneered by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (1992) and applied in Belgium (Cnossen, 2010a).
25 For a rigorous formal analysis, which shows that it is possible to convert an income tax into a progressive
consumption tax (i.e., an expenditure tax), see Bond and Myles (2007).
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BOX 1. THE NATURE OF GST
Source: For fuller treatments, see Auerbach (2006) and Slemrod (1997).
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The nature of the GST can be best explained by reference to a simple equation showing the accounting identity between
the sources (wages and capital income) and the uses of income (consumption and savings) which forms the basis for a
country’s national accounts (or a simple household budget ). The following identity shows the relationship between the
two sides of the accounts for a closed economy and abstracting from government operations.
Y ≡ W + R ≡ C + S (≡ I) (1)
or
C ≡ Y – S ≡ W + [R – I]  (2)
Y is total income composed of labour income W and capital income R, C is consumption, and S is savings (which
equals I, that is, investment). R is the sum of the risk-free or normal return on capital (in other words, its opportunity cost,
comparable to the interest on medium-term government bonds), entrepreneurial rewards for risk-taking (which can also be
considered labour income), and economic rents. In short, R represents business profits, conventionally computed (and
other capital income, which is left out of consideration). The opportunity cost of capital is also called the hurdle rate of
return. A business will go on investing up to the point at which the expected rate of return on the project just equals the
discount rate, which equals the opportunity cost of capital.
Each of the three terms in identity (2) can serve as the base for a particular consumption tax. Basically, the retail sales
tax (RST) has C as its base (individual consumption expenditures at the retail level). Similarly, the personal expenditure
tax can be identified with a tax on Y – S levied at the individual level. This tax resembles the present wage tax under
which pension contributions (savings) are left out of the income tax base and disposable income is consumed completely,
as are later pension payouts (along with the accrued capital income). 
The term W + [R – I], representing value added, forms the base for the GST. At the business level this value added is
equivalent to the difference between sales and purchases in the P&L account, but calculated on a cash flow basis.
Investments (including inventories) are expensed immediately or, to use GST terminology, the full input tax credit can be
deducted immediately from the output tax. This contrasts with the income tax's matching principle under which the cost of
investments is expensed over their economic life, which implies that the normal return on capital is taxed. 
In addition to wages W, business cash flow [R - I] is also taxed under the GST. The taxation of business cash flow
distinguishes a consumption tax from a wage tax, which taxes W only. These two taxes are equal if R - I is zero, which is
the case in a fully competitive market in which no economic rents are earned. Furthermore, investment I may be taken to
represent the present value of the services rendered by new business assets discounted at the normal rate of return on
capital. Therefore, R - I represents the inframarginal return on old business assets. On the introduction (increase) of a
consumption tax, this tax is capitalized in the form of a lower value of the old assets, a loss that is suffered by the owners.
For this reason, economists refer to the GST as a tax on wages plus old capital. 
This discussion shows that the only difference between a consumption tax and an income tax concerns the tax treatment
of the normal risk-free, inflation-adjusted return on capital, which is exempt under a consumption tax but taxed under an
income tax. It follows that a GST can be converted into an income tax by disallowing an immediate credit for the tax on
investment goods against the tax on sales, but permitting this credit to be spread over the economic life of investment
goods. By the same token, an income tax can be converted into a GST by taxing wages plus business profits after
permitting an immediate write-off for investment goods and clawing back any deduction for interest. Note that economic
rents (and entrepreneurial rewards for risk taking) can be taxed without harming investment (and work effort).
Finally, in an open economy, imports (foreign wages and business cash-flow) would be taxed. Offsetting exchange-rate
adjustments or compensating domestic price movements would tend to preserve the initial situation, but real effects
would occur to the extent that old foreign assets would be taxed. This would benefit government saving if a country is a
net creditor to the rest of the world.
b. Open economy
Does this conclusion have to be modified in an open economy? Less than seems to be the case
at first sight. Labour and capital income can now be taxed under the source or the residence
principle. Under the source principle, only income earned in the taxing jurisdiction is taxed;
under the residence principle income earned abroad is also included in the tax base. In practice,
the source principle applies to labour income, which is taxed where the labour is performed.
The same holds for the normal return on equity and business cash flow; in fact, the corporation
or business income tax is a source-based tax. The gains on foreign direct investments
(controlling stakes) are mostly exempt from tax in Canada (and in most other countries).26
Only portfolio income, including interest on debt, is in principle taxable in the country of the
shareholder or the bond holder. However, if deductible interest is not taxed in Canada and
elsewhere and other gains on portfolio investments are not taxable (because they consist of
capital gains on shares, for example) then the IT largely retains its character of a cash-flow tax
on labour income and business cash flow. 
The GST can be levied according to the destination or the origin principle. Under the
destination principle, goods and services leave the country free of GST and imports are
included in the domestic consumption tax base. Domestic labour income and business cash
flow therefore are not taxed, but foreign labour income and business cash flow are taxed.
Under the origin principle exports are subject to GST, but imports are not.27 An origin-based
GST is equivalent therefore to a source-based IT on labour income and rents. Also, a
destination-based GST is equivalent to an origin-based GST, because compensating
adjustments of the exchange rate and/or domestic prices imply that the level of real trade and
investment is unaffected.28 In short, a tax on exports may be said to be equivalent to a tax on
imports, because imports are exchanged for exports and the same tax is imposed on the
exchange, irrespective of whether the nominal tax is placed on exports or on imports. Again,
we see that the IT and the GST do not differ fundamentally in an open economy.29
The above analysis probably is a fairly accurate description of the Canadian situation. Pension
and retirement annuity contributions are not included in gross income and are not taxed until
the moment of consumption. Investment cannot be dispensed immediately, but much
deductible interest is probably not taxed, either in Canada or abroad. The normal return on
equity is in principle taxable, but substitution of debt for equity enables investors to avoid the
tax (subject to thin capitalization rules). Whether or not foreign portfolio income is taxed in
Canada is an open question. But by and large, the Canadian IT resembles a cash-flow source
tax on labour income and rents. As shown above, this is also the nature of an origin GST,
which is in turn equivalent to a destination GST.
26 This can be inferred from the Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of Taxation (2008), which includes a
recommendation to “[B]roaden the existing exemption system to cover all foreign active business income earned by
foreign affiliates.”
27 This (correct) definition of the origin principle should not be confused with the (less correct) use of the concept by
the European Commission which defines ‘origin’ as the country of the initial VAT imposition, even though the
receipts are transferred to the member state of consumption (so that the destination principle is applied). 
28 For the equivalence conditions (uniform taxation, balanced trade flows, no intergenerational wealth effects), see the
lucid treatment in chapter 17 of Ebrill, et al (2001). 
29 But it should be noted that in an open economy, as mentioned in Box 1, the GST would be imposed on foreign
business cash flow with salutary effects on the importing country’s government savings if a country is a net creditor
to the rest of the world. 
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c. Differences between IT and GST
Although the GST and IT are broadly similar cash-flow taxes on labour income and rents,
nonetheless there are differences that should be taken into consideration. Thus, not all savings
or interest are deductible under the IT30 and it will not always be possible to eliminate the tax
on the normal return by substituting debt, whose return is not taxed, for equity. This should
distort the level and composition of saving and investment. This effect does not occur under a
(non-anticipated) GST increase (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987). 
The GST base is more stable...
An argument in favour of a tax mix change from IT to GST is that the base of the GST is more
stable than the base of the IT, because consumption fluctuates less than income does.31 The
IT’s offsetting advantage is that its greater cyclical variability improves the tax system’s
automatic stabilizing properties over the business cycle. On the other hand, though, a
temporary increase of the GST would probably dampen domestic demand more than a
temporary increase of the IT, which consists mainly of labour income. After all, households
would be inclined to postpone their purchases of durable consumer goods. The greater yield
stability of the GST should reduce the sensitivity of the budget deficit to the business cycle,
which should make it easier to keep the deficit within acceptable bounds in a recession. 
and also more robust...
More importantly, the GST base is more robust than the IT base. The possibilities of avoiding
the tax are probably significantly greater under the IT than the GST.32 In Canada, the IT can be
avoided through, among other methods, profit retention, the incorporation of proprietorships,
the financing of business assets with debt while the return is not or only partially taxed, and by
contributions to old age and annuity schemes whose proceeds are taxed at a later date and at
lower rates.
Further, as noted above, border-crossing tax avoidance and evasion can be practised through
transfer pricing, thin capitalization and royalty transfers. The increased capital mobility and
interwovenness of the international business community make it increasingly difficult —
without further international coordination — to effectively tax the capital income component of
the IT. By substituting capital income for labour income, the labour income component of the
IT is also exposed to erosion. 
30 In Canada, in particular, the provisions for allowable savings are capped so that high-income earners must do their
incremental savings in taxable forms. Accordingly, marginal sources of income may be taxed. 
31 The IT base would be just as stable as the GST base if an immediate write-off were allowed for investments instead
of allowing a deduction for interest. 
32 Tax avoidance means that in principle, higher-taxed income or consumption is converted into de facto lower or
untaxed income or consumption; this phenomenon is also called tax arbitrage.
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Under the GST, domestic avoidance will generally be limited to exempt sectors such as
hospitals, which gain from the in-house performance of food, cleaning and administrative
services in order to save the GST on the labour component of the service. In Canada, this form
of tax avoidance is not very profitable because most of the GST on inputs is rebated. Further,
the product-specific nature of the rate structure should limit the arbitrage between the normal
and the zero rate. The main form of evasion is shadow economy fraud, e.g., the GST-free
provision of services like plumbing, carpeting, painting, gardening, catering, hairdressing, car
repairs and similar activities.33 In support of this observation, Spiro (1993) found that the
GST’s introduction in Canada led to greater tax evasion, since it could be bargained away
between vendor and purchaser via cash transactions. But it should be realized that this form of
VAT evasion invariably is accompanied by IT evasion for the same activities (with greater
revenue loss), in Canada or elsewhere, before or after the introduction of the GST.
...while cross-border shopping hardly increases following a GST increase
Also, the magnitude of international tax arbitrage, in the form of cross-border shopping, is
small under a GST. Although most Canadians live within a one or two hours drive from a US
town, doing one’s shopping across the border is not an attractive option for most Canadian
households, not only because men hate to shop while women hate to drive, but also due to
increased border checks following 9/11. Studies for the EU indicate that the magnitude of
cross-border shopping decreases rapidly with the distance that has to be covered to be able to
shop cheaper elsewhere. Although cross-border shopping may not be insignificant in border
areas, it tends to be small when put in a national context. Further, the GST on big-ticket items,
such as cars and yachts, and on distance selling can be secured by prescribing that the tax
should be paid in the jurisdiction of registration or destination. The emergence of the Internet
should promote GST avoidance, but probably mainly with respect to services (e.g.,
amusement) which are rendered directly to consumers.34 Nearly everywhere, cross-border
shopping has to do with differences in excise duties (high taxes on relatively expensive but
small volume goods).
Somewhat old empirical research (based on interviews with 2000 households) investigated the
distance that Irish buyers were prepared to travel in order to buy cheaper in the UK (Fitz
Gerald, Johnston, and Williams, 1995). The authors found that Irish consumers were only
prepared to travel more than 50 kilometers for a VAT-induced price differential of 10 percent or
more at an expenditure level of €300 or more. As a rule, the Irish did not cross borders for
expenditures of €100 or less. Not surprisingly, the study concluded that substantial differences
in GST rates are feasible in a common market (or a federation, such as Canada, with
differences in provincial tax rates) without an appreciable dent in a country’s (or province’s)
GST yield. Again, the study also showed that excise tax differences dominate cross-border
shopping behaviour. 
33 In Germany and the UK, the revenue lost on account of this form of VAT evasion has been estimated at more than
five percent of VAT receipts or half of all VAT lost (see Cnossen, 2010). Other forms of VAT evasion are suppression
fraud (understatement of sales and overstatement of tax credits), contrived insolvency fraud (passing on high tax
credits without paying the underlying tax), and, to a lesser extent, carousel fraud (the cross-border counterpart of
insolvency fraud).
34 The GST on cross-border services rendered to businesses is either prevented through reverse-charging provisions or
undone because there is no GST credit when the services are incorporated in other goods or services.
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Further, the GST is politically less vulnerable...
There is another reason why the GST offers a more stable tax base than the IT. In contrast to
the IT, the GST is more difficult to use for ‘tax expenditures’ purposes, that is, the
subsidization of politically worthy goals through the tax system (except upon introduction, as
the Canadian experience testifies). The GST is less suitable for the tax-induced promotion of
saving, investment, employment, greening, charitable giving and other goals than the IT. A
shift from the taxation of income to consumption, moreover, should lessen the political
inclination for tax expenditures, since the gains for the beneficiaries would be correspondingly
smaller following a decrease of the IT. 
...but note the progressivity of the IT vs. the GST
Although the IT is sensitive to rent-seeking behaviour, it is equipped to take personal
circumstances into account, such as the nature of the taxable household. Also, the burden
distribution can be made progressive through the introduction of basic allowances and
graduated rates that increase as income increases. This is not possible under an in rem tax, such
as the GST. Various studies show that the burden distribution of the GST is largely proportional
with respect to income and consumption, except at the lower and upper end of the income
distribution. The zero rate on basic groceries — a baffling anomaly of Canada’s GST — hardly
mitigates the burden distribution. In absolute terms, the benefit accrues mainly to higher-
income groups.35 Whatever the burden distribution of the GST or IT for that matter, there is the
overriding consideration that redistributive policy objectives should be pursued through
government expenditures rather than taxes because government expenditures are more cost-
effective (Dahlby, 2003). 
Tax-mix shifting should also affect wealth distribution. An increase in the GST implies a one-
off tax on owners of consumption goods-producing assets. This loss will be shared with owners
of nominal assets if the increase is accompanied by an (unanticipated) increase of the price
level. This implies that the government’s debt as a percentage of national income will decline.
A decrease of the IT on the other hand, implies a higher after-tax return for asset holders if and
to the extent this return is taxed lower. Whether or not these effects compensate each other
depends on the consumption path of stakeholders. Wealth-owning elderly, who consume
currently, would be hit hardest. Thus, a tax burden shift would also imply an intergenerational
redistribution of wealth (and income), whether intended or not.36
35 For an early examination of the Canadian scene, see Cnossen (1989). 
36 As Jonathan Kesselman has pointed out to me, in addition to this general effect, there will be different effects across
individuals depending on their assets or savings relative to their income and/or different age/cohort at the time of the
tax mix shift. To illustrate, take two individuals both at the point of retirement from the labour force. The tax mix
change will decrease IT rates and increase GST rates. For the individual who has undertaken savings via tax-deferred
vehicles (Registered Pension Plans and Registered Retirement Savings Plans), the decrease in the IT rate will be
favourable while the GST increase will be unfavourable, thus providing some offset. For the individual who has
undertaken savings via tax-prepaid vehicles (tax-free savings accounts and home equity), the IT rate cut will have no
favourable effect, while the GST increase will be unfavourable, thus netting out as an unambiguously unfavourable
impact.
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5. CONCLUSION: GST HIGHER, IT LOWER
The previous discussion yields a number of conclusions. 
• First, the average and marginal IT burdens for a married two-earner household with two
children differs little between various countries. The GST/excise burden on the other hand
generally is lower in Canada than in most other countries. A move towards a higher GST
and a lower IT does not imply, therefore, that Canada would move out of step with other
countries. 
• Secondly, IT and GST exhibit large practical similarities. If the normal return on capital is
not taxed under the IT (and that appears to be largely the case), then both taxes can be
characterized as cash-flow taxes on labour income and rents. The practical similarity also
suggests that the transitional effects of a tax-base shift should be minimal. 
• Thirdly, various differential effects do not change this picture in important ways, although it
should be emphasized that an IT can take ability-to-pay factors into account. This is hardly
possible under the GST (although the GST refund for poor families helps); the zero rate
does not effect a meaningful reduction of the tax burden for the less well-off. 
• Fourthly, the GST is more robust than the IT. Domestic and cross-border arbitrage affects
the GST less than the IT. Significant rate differences with the US and between provinces
are feasible. 
Finally, it should be noted that differences in the incidence between the IT and the GST, in
view of their practical equivalence, are so small that a shift in the tax base should not or hardly
affect employment or, for that matter, saving and investment. For this to happen, it would be
necessary to drop the condition of distributional neutrality: the IT reduction for people actually
employed should be larger than their GST increase. People outside the labour force can then
only be compensated for the GST increase if the condition of revenue neutrality is dropped.
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APPENDIX A. 
LEVEL AND COMPOSITION OF THE TAX BURDEN IN CANADA AND
SOME OTHER COUNTRIES IN 2009
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-2010 (Paris, 2011), Part II and individual country tables in
Part III. Totals may not add because of rounding. For Canada, Italy, New Zealand and Spain:
unallocable receipts from income and profits taxes have been added to personal and corporate
tax revenues in proportion to their shares in total tax revenues. The same has been done for
Italy with respect to unallocable receipts from VATs + excise duties, and from use taxes. For all
EU member states, customs duties collected for the EU have been added to revenues from
specific goods and services. Data for personal capital income are not available for non-EU
countries; hence, personal labour income includes this item for all countries and the data in the
PM column Personal income under the heading Capital are memorandum items. For the EU
data, see European Commission (2011, table 62). 
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